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Abstract
In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access control game with continuous-
variable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that
the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size,
i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of
anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one
specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionarily
stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes
of evolutionary game dynamics, such as Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, Smith dynamics
and replicator dynamics. In addition, we examine correlated equilibrium for the single-receiver
model. Correlated strategies are based on signaling structures before making decisions on rates.
We then focus on evolutionary games for hybrid additive white Gaussian noise multiple access
channel with multiple users and multiple receivers, where each user chooses a rate and splits it
over the receivers. Users have coupled constraints determined by the capacity regions. Building
upon the static game, we formulate a system of hybrid evolutionary game dynamics using G-
function dynamics and Smith dynamics on rate control and channel selection, respectively. We
show that the evolving game has an equilibrium and illustrate these dynamics with numerical
examples.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been much interest in understanding the behavior of multiple access controls
under constraints. Considerable amount of work has been carried out on the problem of how users
can obtain an acceptable throughput by choosing rates independently. Motivated by the interest
in studying a large population of users playing the game over time, evolutionary game theory was
found to be an appropriate framework for communication networks. It has been applied to problems
such as power control in wireless networks and mobile interference control [11, 1, 5, 6].
The game-theoretical models considered in the previous studies on user behaviors in CDMA,
[37, 4], are static one-shot non-cooperative games in which users are assumed to be rational and
optimize their payoffs independently. Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, studies games
that are played repeatedly, and focuses on the strategies that persist over time, yielding the best
fitness of a user in a non-cooperative environment on a large time scale.
In [19], an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) multiple access channel problem was modeled
as a noncooperative game with pairwise interactions, in which users were modeled as rational
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entities whose only interest was to maximize their own communication rates. The authors obtained
the Nash equilibrium of the two-user game and introduced a two-player evolutionary game model
with pairwise interactions based on replicator dynamics. However, the case when interactions are
not pairwise arises frequently in communication networks, such as the Code Division Multiple
Access (CDMA) or the Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) in Worldwide
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) environment [11].
In this work, we extend the study of [19] to wireless communication systems with an arbitrary
number of users corresponding to each receiver. We formulate a static non-cooperative game
with m users subject to rate capacity constraints, and extend the constrained game to a dynamic
evolutionary game with a large number of users whose strategies evolve over time. Different from
evolutionary games with discrete and finite number of actions, our model is based on a class of
continuous games, known as continuous-trait games. Evolutionary games with continuum action
spaces can be encountered in a wide variety of applications in evolutionary ecology, such as evolution
of phenology, germination, nutrient foraging in plants, and predator-prey foraging [24, 7].
In addition to the single receiver model, we investigate the case with multiple users and receivers.
We first formulate a static hybrid non-cooperative game with N users who rationally make decisions
on the rates as well as the channel selection subject to rate capacity constraints of each receiver.
We extend the static game to a dynamic evolutionary game by viewing rate selections governed by
a fitness function parameterized by the channel selections. Such a concept of a hybrid model has
appeared earlier in [36] and [40], in the context of hybrid power control in CDMA systems. The
strategies of channel selections determine the long-term fitness of the rates chosen by each user.
We formulate such dynamics based on generalized Smith dynamics and generating fitness function
(G-function) dynamics.
1.1 Contribution
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. We first introduce a game-
theoretic framework for local interactions between many users and a single receiver. We show that
the static continuous-kernel rate allocation game with coupled rate constraints has a convex set of
pure Nash equilibria, coinciding with the maximal face of the polyhedral capacity region. All the
pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and are also strong equilibria, resilient to simultaneous devia-
tion by coalition of any size. We show that the pure Nash equilibria in the rate allocation problem
are 100% efficient in terms of Price of Anarchy (PoA) and constrained Strong Price of Anarchy
(CSPoA). We study the stability of strong equilibria, normalized equilibria, and evolutionary stable
strategies (ESS) using evolutionary game dynamics such as Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics,
generalized Smith dynamics, and replicator dynamics. We further investigate the correlated equi-
librium of the multiple access game where the receiver can send signals to the users to mediate the
behaviors of the transmitters.
Based on the single-receiver model, we then propose an evolutionary game-theoretic framework
for the hybrid additive white Gaussian noise multiple access channel. We consider a communication
system of multiple users and multiple receivers, where each user chooses a rate and splits it over the
receivers. Users have coupled constraints determined by the capacity regions. We characterize Nash
equilibrium of the static game and show the existence of the equilibrium under general conditions.
Building upon the static game, we formulate a system of hybrid evolutionary game dynamics using
G-function dynamics and Smith dynamics on rate control and channel selection, respectively. We
show that the evolving game has an equilibrium and illustrate these dynamics with numerical
examples.
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Table 1: List of Notations
Symbol Meaning
N set of N users
Ω a subset of N users
J set of J receivers
Ai action set of user i
Pi maximum power of user i
hi channel gain of user i
αi rate of user i
pij probability of user i selecting receiver j
ui payoff of user i
U i expected payoff of user i
C capacity region of a set N of users in a single receiver case
C(j) capacity region of a set N of users at receiver j
λi distribution over the action set Ai
µ population state
1.2 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present in Section 2.1 the evolutionary game
model of rate allocation in additive white Gaussian multiple access wireless networks, and analyze
its equilibria and Pareto optimality in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we present strong equilibria
and price of anarchy of the game. In Section 2.4, we discuss how to select one specific equilibrium
such as normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. Section 2.5 studies the stability
of equilibria and evolution of strategies using game dynamics. Section 2.6 analyzes the correlated
equilibrium of the multiple acess game.
In Section 3.1, we present the hybrid rate control model where users can choose the rates and
the probability of the channels to use. In Section 3.2, we characterize the Nash equilibrium of the
constrained hybrid rate control game model, pointing out the existence of the Nash equilibrium of
the hybrid model and methods to find it. In Section 3.3, we apply evolutionary dynamics to both
rates and channel selection probabilities. We use simulations to demonstrate the validity of these
proposed dynamics and illustrate the evolution of the overall evolutionary dynamics of the hybrid
model. Section 4 concludes the paper. For reader’s convenience, we summarize the notations in
Table 1 and the acronyms in Table 2.
2 AWGN Mutiple Access Model: Single Receiver Case
We consider a communication system consisting of several receivers and several senders (see Figure
1). At each time, there are several simultaneous local interactions (typically, at each receiver there
is a local interaction). Each local interaction corresponds to a non-cooperative one-shot game with
common constraints. The opponents do not necessarily stay the same from a given time slot to the
next one. Users revise their rates in view of their payoffs and the coupled constraints (for example
by using an evolutionary process, a learning process or a trial-and-error updating process). The
game evolves over time. Users are interested in maximizing a fitness function based on their own
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Table 2: List of Acronyms
Abbreviation Meaning
AGWN Additive White Gaussian Noise
MAC Multiple Access Control
MISO Multi-Input and Multi-Output
CCE Constrained Correlated Equilibrium
ESS Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium
NE Nash Equilibrium
PoA Price of Anarchy
SPoA Strong Price of Anarchy
communication rates at each time, and they are aware of the fact that the other users have the
same goal. The coupled power and rate constraints are also common knowledge. Users have to
choose independently their own coding rates at the beginning of the communication, where the
rates selected by a user may be either deterministic, or chosen from some distribution. If the rate
profile arrived at as a result of these independent decisions lies in the capacity region, users will
communicate at that operating point. Otherwise, either the receiver is unable to decode any signal
and the observed rates are zero, or only one of the signals can be decoded. The latter occurs
when all the other users are transmitting at or below a safe rate. With these assumptions, we can
define a constrained non-cooperative game. The set of allowed strategies for user i is the set of
all probability distributions over [0,+∞[, and the payoff is a function of the rates. In addition,
the rational action (rate) sets are restricted to lie in the capacity regions (the payoff is zero if
the constraint is violated). In order to study the interactions between the selfish or partially
cooperative users and their stationary rates in the long run, we propose to model the problem of
rate allocation in Gaussian multiple access channels as an evolutionary game with a continuous
action space and coupled constraints. The development of evolutionary game theory is a major
contribution of biology to competitive decision making and the evolution of cooperation. The key
concepts of evolutionary game theory are (i) Evolutionary Stable States [27], which is a refinement of
equilibria, and (ii) Evolutionary Game Dynamics such as replicator dynamics [32], which describes
the evolution of strategies or frequencies of use of strategies in time, [7, 21].
The single population evolutionary rate allocation game is described as follows: there is one
population of senders (users) and several receivers. The number of senders is large. At each time,
there are many one-shot games called local interactions. Each sender of the population chooses
from his set of strategies Ai which is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of R. Without loss
of generality, we can suppose that user i chooses its rate in the interval Ai = [0, C{i}], where C{i} is
the rate upper bound for user i (to be made precise shortly), as outside of the capacity region the
payoff (as to be defined later) will be zero. Let ∆(Ai) be the set of probability distributions over
the pure strategy set Ai. The set ∆(Ai) can be interpreted as the set of mixed strategies. It is also
interpreted as the set of distributions of strategies among the population. Let λi ∈ ∆(Ai), and E
be a λi− measurable subset of RN ; then λi(E) represents the fraction of users choosing a strategy
out of E, at time t. A distribution λi ∈ ∆(Ai) is sometimes called the “state” of the population.
We denote by B(Ai) the Borel σ−algebra on Ai and by d(λ, λ′) the distance between two states
measured with the respect to the weak topology. Each user’s payoff depends on opponents’ behavior
through the distribution of opponents’ choices and of their strategies. The payoff of a user i in a
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Figure 1: A population: distributed receivers and senders, represented by blue rectangles and red
circles respectively.
local interaction with (N − 1) other users is given as a function ui : RN −→ R. The rate profile
α ∈ RN must belong to a common capacity region C ⊂ RN defined by 2N − 1 linear inequalities.
The expected payoff of a sender i transmitting at a rate a when the state of the population is
µ ∈ ∆(Ai) is given by Fi(a, µ). The expected payoff for user i is
Fi(λi, µ) :=
∫
α∈C
ui(α) λi(dαi)
∏
j 6=i
µ(dαj).
The population state is subjected to the “mixed extension” of capacity constraintsM(C). This will
be discussed in Section 2.5 and will be made more precise later.
2.1 Local Interactions
Local interaction refers to the problem setting of one receiver and its uplink additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) multiple access channel with N senders with coupled constraints (or actions). The
signal at the receiver is given by Y = ξ +
∑N
i=1Xi where Xi is a transmitted signal of user i and
ξ is a zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance σ20. Each user has an individual power constraint
E(X2i ) ≤ Pi and the channel gain hi. The optimal power allocation scheme is to transmit at the
maximum power available, i.e. Pi, for each user. Hence, we consider the case in which maximum
power is attained. The decisions of the users then consist of choosing their communication rates,
and the receiver’s role is to decode, if possible. The capacity region is the set of all vectors α ∈ RN+
such that users i ∈ N := {1, 2, . . . , N} can reliably communicate at rate αi, i ∈ N . The capacity
region C for this channel is the set
C =
{
α ∈ RN+
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Ω
αi ≤ log
(
1 + |Ω|
Pihi
σ20
)
.∀ ∅ $ Ω ⊆ N
}
,
Example 1. (Example of capacity region with three users) In this example, we illustrate the capacity
region with three users. Let α1, α2, α3 be the rates of the users and Pi = P, hi = h,∀i = 1, 2, 3.
5
Based on (1), we obtain a set of inequalities

α1 ≥ 0, α2 ≥ 0, α3 ≥ 0
αi ≤ log
(
1 + Ph
σ2
0
)
, i = 1, 2, 3
αi + αj ≤ log
(
1 + 2Ph
σ2
0
)
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, 3.
α1 + α2 + α3 ≤ log
(
1 + 3Ph
σ2
0
) ,
or in the compact notation, M3γ3 ≤ ζ3, where
γ3 :=

 α1α2
α3

 ∈ R3+, ζ3 :=


C{1}
C{2}
C{3}
C{1,2}
C{1,3}
C{2,3}
C{1,2,3}


,M3 :=


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1


∈ Z7×3.
Note that M3 is a totally unimodular matrix. By letting Ph = 25, σ
2
0 = 0.1, we sketch in Figure 2
the capacity region with three users.
The capacity region reveals a competitive nature of the interactions among senders: if a user i
wants to communicate at a higher rate, one of the other users has to lower his rate; otherwise, the
capacity constraint is violated. We let
ri,Ω := log
(
1 +
Pihi
σ20 +
∑
i′∈Ω,i′ 6=i Pi′hi′
)
, i ∈ N ,Ω ⊆ N
denote the bound on the rate of a user when the signals of the |Ω| − 1 other users are treated as
noise.
Due to the noncooperative nature of the rate allocation, we can formulate the one-shot game
Ξ = 〈N , (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉 ,
where the set of users N is the set of players, Ai, i ∈ N , is the set of actions, and ui, i ∈ N , are
the payoff functions.
2.2 Payoffs
We define ui :
∏N
i=1Ai → R+ as follows:
ui(αi, α−i) = ↿C (α)gi(αi, α−i) (1)
=
{
gi(αi) if (αi, α−i) ∈ C
0 otherwise
, (2)
where ↿C is the indicator function; α−i is a vector consisting of other players’ rates, i.e., α−i =
[α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αN ] and ui is a positive and strictly increasing function for each fixed α−i.
Since the game is subject to coupled constraints, the action set Ai is coupled and dependent on
other players’ actions. Given the strategy profile α−i of other players, the constrained action set
Ai is given by
Ai(α−i) := {αi ∈ [0, C{i}], (αi, α−i) ∈ C} (3)
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Figure 2: Capacity region with three users.
We then have an asymmetric game. The minimum rate that the user i can guarantee in the feasible
regions is ri,N which is different than rj,N .
Each user i maximizes ui(αi, α−i) over the coupled constraint set. Owing to the monotonicity of
the function gi and the inequalities that define the capacity region, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let BRi(α−i) be the best reply to the strategy α−i, defined by
BR
i
(α−i) = arg max
y∈Ai(α−i)
ui(y, α−i).
BRi is a non-empty single-valued correspondence (i.e. a standard function), and is given by
max

ri,N , min
Ω∈Γi

CΩ −
∑
k∈Ω\{i}
αk



 , (4)
where Γi = {Ω ∈ 2
N , i ∈ Ω}.
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Proposition 1. The set of Nash equilibria is{
(αi, α−i) | α
i ≥ ri,N ,
∑
i∈N
αi = CN
}
.
All these equilibria are optimal in Pareto sense.
Proof. Let β be a feasible solution, i.e., β ∈ C. If
∑N
i=1 βi < CN = log
(
1 +
∑
i∈N
Pihi
σ2
0
)
, then at
least one of the users can improve its rate (hence its payoff) to reach one of the faces of the capacity
region. We now check the strategy profile on the face{
(αi, α−i)
∣∣∣∣ αi ≥ ri,N ,
N∑
i=1
αi = CN
}
.
If β ∈
{
(αi, α−i)
∣∣∣∣ αi ≥ ri,N ,∑Ni=1 αi = CΩ
}
, then from the Lemma 1, BRi(β−i) = {βi}. Hence,
β is a strict equilibrium. Moreover, this strategy β is Pareto optimal because the rate of each user
is maximized under the capacity constraint. These strategies are social welfare optimal if the total
utility
∑N
i=1 ui(αi, α−i) =
∑N
i=1 gi(αi) is maximized subject to constraints.
Note that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a convex subset of the capacity region.
2.3 Robust Equilibria and Efficiency Measures
2.3.1 Constrained Strong Equilibria and Coalition Proofness
An action profile in a local interaction between N senders is a constrained k−strong equilibrium if
it is feasible and no coalition of size k can improve the rate transmissions of each of its members
with respect to the capacity constraints. An action is a constrained strong equilibrium [18] if it is a
constrained k−strong equilibrium for any size k. A strong equilibrium is then a policy from which
no coalition (of any size) can deviate and improve the transmission rate of every member of the
coalition (group of the simultaneous moves), while possibly lowering the transmission rate of users
outside the coalition group. This notion of constrained strong equilibria1 is very attractive because
it is resilient against coalitions of users. Most of the games do not admit any strong equilibrium
but in our case we will show that the multiple access channel game has several strong equilibria.
Theorem 1. Any rate profile on the maximal face of the capacity region C :
Facemax(C) :=
{
(αi, α−i) ∈ RN | αi ≥ rN ,
N∑
i=1
αi = CN
}
,
is a constrained strong equilibrium.
Proof. We remark that if the rate profile α is not on the maximal face of the capacity region,
then α is not resilient to deviation by a single user. Hence, α cannot be a constrained strong
equilibrium. This says that a necessary condition for a rate profile to be a strong equilibrium is to
be in the subset Facemax(C). We now prove that the condition: α ∈ Facemax(C) is sufficient. Let
α ∈ Facemax(C). Suppose that k users deviate simultaneously from the rate profile α. Denote by
Dev the set of users which deviate simultaneously (eventually by forming a coalition). The rate
constraints of the deviants are
1Note that the set of constrained strong equilibria is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria (by taking coalitions of
size one) and any constrained strong equilibrium is Pareto optimal (by taking coalition of full size).
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1. α′i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Dev,
2.
∑
i∈Ω¯ α
′
i ≤ CΩ¯, ∀Ω¯ ⊆ Dev,
3.
∑
i∈Ω∩Dev α
′
i ≤ CΩ −
∑
i∈Ω,i/∈Dev αi, ∀Ω ⊆ N , Ω ∩Dev 6= ∅.
In particular, for Ω = N , we have
∑
i∈Dev α
′
i ≤ CN −
∑
i/∈Dev αi. The total rate of the deviants
is bounded by CN −
∑
i/∈Dev αi, which is not controlled by the deviants. The deviants move to
(α′i)i∈Dev with ∑
i∈Dev
α′i < CN −
∑
i/∈Dev
αi .
Then, there exists i such that αi > α
′
i. Since gi is non-decreasing, this implies that gi(αi) > gi(α
′
i).
The user i who is a member of the coalition Dev does not improve its payoff. If the rates of some
of the deviants are increased, then the rates of some other users from coalition must decrease. If
(α′i)i∈Dev satisfies ∑
i∈Dev
α′i = CN −
∑
i/∈Dev
αi ,
then some users in the coalition Dev have increased their rates compared with (αi)i∈Dev and some
others in Dev have decreased their rates of transmission (because the total rate is the constant
CN −
∑
i/∈Dev αi). The users in Dev with a lower rate α
′
i ≤ αi do not benefit by being a member of
the coalition (Shapley criterion of membership of coalition does not hold) . And this holds for any
∅ $ Dev j N . This completes the proof.
Corollary 1. In the constrained rate allocation game, Nash equilibria and strong equilibria in pure
strategies coincide.
2.3.2 Constrained Potential Function for Local Interaction
Introduce the following function:
V (α) =↿C (α)
N∑
i=1
gi(αi) ,
where ↿C is the indicator function of C, i.e., ↿C (α) = 1 if α ∈ C and 0 otherwise. The function V
satisfies
V (α)− V (βi, α−i) = gi(αi)− gi(βi), ∀α, (βi, α−i) ∈ C.
If gi is differentiable, then one has
∂
∂αi
V (α) = g′i(αi) =
∂
∂αi
ui
in the interior of the capacity region C, and V is a constrained potential function [3] in pure
strategies.
Corollary 2. The local maximizers of V in C are pure Nash equilibria. Global maximizers of V in
C are both constrained strong equilibria and social optima for the local interaction.
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2.3.3 Strong Price of Anarchy
Throughout this subsection, we assume that the functions gi are the identity function, i.e., gi(x) =
id(x) := x. One metric used to measure how much the performance of decentralized systems is
affected by the selfish behavior of its components is the price of anarchy. We present a similar
price for strong equilibria under the coupled rate constraints. This notion of Price of Anarchy can
be seen as an efficiency metric that measures the price of selfishness or decentralization and has
been extensively used in the context of congestion games or routing games where typically users
have to minimize a cost function [41, 42]. In the context of rate allocation in the multiple access
channel, we define an equivalent measure of price of anarchy for rate maximization problems. One
of the advantages of a strong equilibrium is that it has the potential to reduce the distance between
the optimal solution and the solution obtained as an outcome of selfish behavior, typically in the
case where the capacity constraint is violated at each time. Since the constrained rate allocation
game has strong equilibria, we can define the strong price of anarchy, introduced in [12], as the
ratio between the payoff of the worst constrained strong equilibrium and the social optimum value
which CN .
Theorem 2. The strong price of anarchy of the constrained rate allocation game is 1 for gi(x) = x.
Note that for gi 6= id, the CSPoA can be less than one. However, the optimistic price of anarchy
of the best constrained equilibrium, also called price of stability [13], is one for any function gi i.e
the efficiency of “best” equilibria is 100%.
2.4 Selection of Pure Equilibria
We have shown in the previous sections that our rate allocation game has a continuum of pure
Nash equilibria and strong equilibria. We address now the problem of selecting one equilibrium
which has certain desirable properties: the normalized pure Nash equilibrium, introduced in [29];
see also [31, 20, 23]. We introduce the problem of constrained maximization faced by each user
when the other rates are at the maximal face of the polytope C:
max
α
ui(α) (5)
s.t. α1 + . . . + αN = CN (6)
for which the corresponding Lagrangian for user i is given by
Li(α, ζ) = ui(α)− ζi
(
N∑
i=1
αi − CN
)
.
From Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, it follows that there exists ζ ∈ RN such that
g′i(αi) = ζi,
N∑
i=1
αi = CN .
For a fixed vector ζ with identical entries, define the normal form game Γ(ζ) with N users, where
actions are taken as rates and the payoffs given by L(α, ζ). A normalized equilibrium is an equilib-
rium of the game Γ(ζ∗) where ζ∗ is normalized into the form ζ∗i =
c
τi
, c > 0, τi > 0. We now have
the following result due to Goodman [20] which implies Rosen’s condition on uniqueness for strict
concave games.
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Theorem 3. Let ui be a smooth and strictly concave function in αi, each ui be convex in α−i, and
there exist some ζ such that the weighted non-negative sum of the payoffs
∑N
i=1 ζiui(α) is concave
in α. Then, the matrix G(α, ζ) + GT (α, ζ) is negative definite (which implies uniqueness) where
G(α, ζ) is the Jacobian with respect to α of
h(α, ζ) := [ζ1∇1u1(α), ζ2∇2u2(α), . . . , ζN∇NuN (α)]
T
and GT is the transpose of the matrix G.
This now leads to the following corollary for our problem.
Corollary 3. If gi are non-decreasing strictly concave functions, then the rate allocation game has
a unique normalized equilibrium which corresponds to an equilibrium of the normal form game with
payoff L(α, ζ∗) for some ζ∗.
2.5 Stability and Dynamics
In this subsection, we study the stability of equilibria and several classes of evolutionary game
dynamics under a symmetric case, i.e., Pi = P, hi = h, gi = g,Ai = A, ∀i ∈ N . We will drop
subscript index i where appropriate. We show that the associated evolutionary game has a unique
pure constrained evolutionary stable strategy.
Proposition 2. The collection of rates α =
(
CN
N , . . . ,
CN
N
)
, i.e. the distribution of Dirac concen-
trated on the rate CNN , is the unique symmetric pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since the constrained rate allocation game is symmetric, there exists a symmetric (pure or
mixed) Nash equilibrium. If such an equilibrium exists in pure strategies, each user transmits with
the same rate r∗. It follows from Proposition 1 of Section 2.2, and the bound rN ≤
CN
N that r
∗
satisfies Nr∗ = CN and r
∗ is feasible.
Since the set of feasible actions is convex, we can define convex combination of rates in the set
of the feasible rates. For example, ǫα′ + (1 − ǫ)α is a feasible rate if α′ and α are feasible. The
symmetric rate profile (r, r, . . . , r) is feasible if and only if 0 ≤ r ≤ r∗ = CNN . We say that the rate
r is a constrained evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if it is feasible and for every mutant strategy
mut 6= α there exists ǫmut > 0 such that{
rǫ := ǫ mut+ (1− ǫ)r ∈ C ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫmut)
u(r, rǫ, . . . , rǫ) > u(mut, rǫ, . . . , rǫ) ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫmut)
Theorem 1. The pure strategy r∗ = CNN is a constrained evolutionary stable strategy.
Proof. Let mut ≤ r∗ The rate ǫ mut + (1 − ǫ)r∗ is feasible implies that mut ≤ r∗ (because r∗
is the maximum symmetric rate achievable). Since mut 6= r∗, mut is strictly lower than r∗. By
monotonicity of the function g, one has u(r∗, ǫ mut + (1 − ǫ)r∗) > u(mut, ǫ mut+ (1 − ǫ)r∗), ∀ǫ.
This completes the proof.
2.5.1 Symmetric Mixed Strategies
Define the mixed capacity region M(C) as the set of measures profile (µ1, µ2, . . . , µN ) such that∫
R|Ω|
+
(∑
i∈Ω
αi
)∏
i∈Ω
µi(dαi) ≤ CΩ, ∀Ω ⊆ 2
N .
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Then, the payoff of the action a ∈ R+ satisfying (a, λ, . . . , λ) ∈ M(C) can be defined as
F (a, µ) =
∫
[0,∞[N−1
u(a, b2, . . . , bN ) νN−1(db) , (7)
where νk =
⊗k
1 µ is the product measure on [0,∞[
k. The constraint set becomes the set of proba-
bility measures on R+ such that
0 ≤ E(µ) :=
∫
R+
αi µ(dαi) ≤
CN
N
< C{1} .
Lemma 2. The payoff can be obtained as follows:
F (a, µ) =↿[0,CN−(N−1)E(µ)] ×g(a)×
∫
b∈Da
νN−1(db) =↿[0,CN−(m−1)E(µ)] ×g(a)νN−1(Da),
where Da = {(b2, . . . , bN ) | (a, b2, . . . , bN ) ∈ C} .
Proof. If the rate does not satisfy the capacity constraints, then the payoff is 0. Hence the rational
rate for user i is lower than C{i}. Fix a rate a ∈ [0, C{i}]. Let D
a
Ω := CΩ − aδ{1∈Ω}. Then, a
necessary condition to have a non-zero payoff is (b2, . . . , bN ) ∈ Da , where Da = {(b2, . . . , bN ) ∈
RN−1+ ,
∑
i∈Ω,i 6=1 bi ≤ D
a
Ω, Ω ⊆ 2
N }. Thus, we have
F (a, µ) =
∫
RN−1
+
u(a, b2, . . . , bN ) νN−1(db)
=
∫
b∈RN−1
+
, (a,b)∈C
g(a) νN−1(db)
= ↿[0,CN−(N−1)E(µ)] g(a) ×
∫
b∈Da
νN−1(db)
2.5.2 Constrained Evolutionary Game Dynamics
The class of evolutionary games in large population provides a simple framework for describing
strategic interactions among large numbers of users. In this subsection we turn to modeling the
behavior of the users who play them. Traditionally, predictions of behavior in game theory are
based on some notion of equilibrium, typically Cournot equilibrium, Bertrand equilibrium, Nash
equilibrium, Stackelberg solution, Wardrop equilibrium or some refinement thereof. These notions
require the assumption of equilibrium knowledge, which posits that each user correctly anticipates
how his opponents will act. The equilibrium knowledge assumption is too strong and is difficult to
justify in particular in contexts with large numbers of users. As an alternative to the equilibrium
approach, we propose an explicitly dynamic updating choice, a procedure in which users myopically
update their behavior in response to their current strategic environment. This dynamic procedure
does not assume the automatic coordination of users’ actions and beliefs, and it can derive many
specifications of users’ choice procedures. These procedures are specified formally by defining a
revision of rates called revision protocol [30]. A revision protocol takes current payoffs and current
mean rate and maps to conditional switch rates which describe how frequently users in some class
playing rate α who are considering switching rates switch to strategy α′. Revision protocols are
flexible enough to incorporate a wide variety of paradigms, including ones based on imitation,
adaptation, learning, optimization, etc.
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We use here a class of continuous evolutionary dynamics. We refer to [33, 14, 34] for evolutionary
game dynamics with or without time delays. The continuous-time evolutionary game dynamics on
the measure space (A,B(A), µ) is given by
λ˙t(E) =
∫
a∈E
V (a, λt)µ(da) (8)
where
V (a, λt) = K
[∫
x∈A
βxa (λt)λt(dx)−
∫
x∈A
βax(λt)λt(dx)
]
,
and βxa represents the rate of mutation from x to a, and K is a growth parameter. β
x
a (λt) = 0
if (x, λt) or (a, λt) is not in the (mixed) capacity region, E is a µ−measurable subset of A. At
each time t, probability measure λt satisfies
d
dtλt(A) = 0. We examine the following classes of
evolutionary game dynamics, namely, Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, Smith dynamics and
replicator dynamics, where F (a, λt) is the payoff in (7) as defined in the previous subsection.
RD-1: Constrained Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics.
βxa (λt) =
{
max(F (a, λt)−
∫
x F (x, λt) dx, 0) if (a, λt), (x, λt) ∈ M(C),
0 otherwise.
RD-2: Constrained Replicator Dynamics.
βxa (λt) =
{
max(F (a, λt)− F (x, λt), 0) if (a, λt), (x, λt) ∈ M(C)
0 otherwise.
RD-3: Constrained θ−Smith Dynamics.
βxa (λt) =
{
max(F (a, λt)− F (x, λt), 0)
θ if (a, λt), (x, λt) ∈ M(C)
0 otherwise.
, θ ≥ 1
A common property that applies to all these dynamics is that the set of Nash equilibria is a subset
of rest points (stationary points) of the evolutionary game dynamics. Here we extend the concepts
of these dynamics to evolutionary games with a continuum action space and coupled constraints,
and more than two-users interactions. The counterparts of these results in discrete action space
can be found in [21, 30].
Theorem 2. Any Nash equilibrium of the game is a rest point of the following evolutionary game
dynamics: constrained Brown-von Neumann-Nash, generalized Smith dynamics, and replicator dy-
namics. In particular, the evolutionary stable strategies set is a subset of the rest points of these
constrained evolutionary game dynamics.
Proof. It is clear for pure equilibria by using the revision protocols β of these dynamics. Let λ be
an equilibrium. For any rate a in the support of λ, βax = 0 if F (x, λ) ≤ F (a, λ). Thus, if λ is an
equilibrium, the difference between the microscopic inflow and outflow is V (a, λ) = 0, given that a
is the support of the measure λ.
Let λ be a finite Borel measure on [0, C{i}] with full support. Suppose g is continuous on [0, C{i}].
Then, λ is a rest point of the BNN dynamics if and only if λ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Note
that the choice of topology is an important issue when defining dynamics convergence and stability
of the dynamics. The most used in this area is the topology of the weak convergence to measure
closeness of two states of the system. Different distances (Prohorov metric, metric on bounded and
Lipschitz continuous functions on A) have been proposed. We refer the reader to [26], and the
references therein for more details on evolutionary robust strategy and stability notions.
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2.6 Correlated Equilibrium
In this subsection, we analyze constrained correlated equilibria of multiple access (MAC) games.
Building upon the signaling in the one-shot game, we formulate a system of evolutionary MAC
games with evolutionary evolutionary game dynamics that describe the evolution of signaling,
beliefs, rate control and channel selection, respectively.
We focus on correlated equilibrium in the single-receiver case. Correlated strategies are based
on signaling structures before making decisions on rates. Different scenarios (with or without
mediator, virtual mediator, cryptographic multi-stage signaling structure) have been proposed in
the literature [15, 39, 16, 17].
Figure 3: Signaling between multiple senders and a receiver
In Figure 3, we illustrate the signaling between multiple transmitters and one receiver. The
receiver can act as a signaling device to mediate the behaviors of the transmitters. The correlated
equilibrium has a strong connection with cryptography in that the private signal sent to the users
can be realized by the coding and decoding in the network [39].
Let B be the set of signals β = [βi, β−i] ∈ RN . The values β from the set of signals need to be
in the feasible set C ⊂ RN . Let µ ∈ ∆B be a probability measure over the set B. A constrained
correlated equilibrium (CCE) µ∗ need to satisfy the following set of inequalities,∫
dµ∗(βi, β−i)
[
ui(αi, α−i, | βi)− ui(α
′
i, α−i | βi)
]
≥ 0,∀i ∈ N , α′i ∈ Ai(α−i).
Define a rule of assignment of user i as a map its signals to its action’s set r¯i : βi 7−→ αi. A CCE
is then characterized by∫
dµ∗(β) [ui(αi, α−i | βi)− ui(ri(βi), α−i)] ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N ,∀ri such that r¯i(.) ∈ Ai(α−i). (9)
Theorem 3. The set of constrained pure Nash equilibria of the MISO game is given by
max-face(C) =
{
(α1, . . . , αN ) | αi ≥ 0,
∑
k∈N
αk = CN
}
We can characterize the CCE using the above results as follows.
Lemma 3. Any mixture of constrained pure Nash equilibria of the MISO game is a constrained
correlated equilibrium.
14
Note that the set of constrained correlated equilibria is bigger than the set of constrained Nash
equilibria. For example, in a two-user case, the distribution 12δ(r1,C{1,2}−r1) +
1
2δ(C{1,2}−r2,r2) is
different than the Dirac distribution δ
(
r1+C{1,2}−r2
2
,
r2+C{1,2}−r1
2
)
.
Proof. Let µ be a probability distribution over some constrained pure equilibria. Then, µ ∈
∆(max-face(C)). For any β such that µ(β) 6= 0, one has
[ui(αi, α−i | βi)− ui(r¯i(βi), α−i)] ≥ 0
for any measurable function r¯i : [0, C{i}] −→ [0, C{i}]. Thus, µ is a constrained correlated equilib-
rium.
Corollary 4. Any convex combination of extreme point of the convex compact set
max-face(C) =
{
α = (α1, . . . , αN ) | αi ≥ ri,
∑
k∈N
αk = CN
}
is a constrained correlated equilibrium. Moreover any probability distribution over the maximal face
of the capacity region max-face(C) is a correlated constrained equilibrium distribution.
3 Hybrid AWGN Multiple Access Control
In this section, we extend the single receiver case to one with multiple receivers. Multi-input and
multi-output (MIMO) channel access game has been studied in the context of power allocation
and control. For instance, the authors in [6] formulate a two-player zero-sum game where the first
player is the group of transmitters and the second one is the set of MIMO sub-channels. In [5], the
authors formulate an N -person non-cooperative power allocation game and study its equilibrium
under two different decoding schemes.
Here, we formulate a hybrid multiple access game where users are allowed to select their rates
and channels under capacity constraints. We first obtain general results on the existence of the
equilibrium and methods to characterize it. In addition, we investigate long-term behavior of the
strategies and apply evolutionary game dynamics to both rates and channel selection probabilities.
We show that G-function based dynamics is appropriate for our hybrid model by viewing the channel
selection probabilities as strategies that determine of fitness of rate selection. Using the generalized
Smith dynamics for channel selection, we are able to build an overall hybrid evolutionary dynamics
for the static model. Based on simulations, we confirm the validity of these proposed dynamics and
the correspondence between the rest point of the dynamics and the Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Hybrid Model with Rate Control and Channel Selection
In this subsection, we establish a model for multiple users and multiple receivers. Each user
needs to decide the rate at which to transmit and the channel to pick. We formulate a game
Ξ = 〈N , (Ai)i∈N , (U i)i∈N 〉, in which the decision variable is (αi,pi), and pi = [pij]j∈J is a J-
dimensional vector, where pij is the probability of user i ∈ N to choose channel j ∈ J and pij
needs to satisfy the probability measure constraints∑
j∈J
pij = 1, pij ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N (10)
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The game Ξ is asymmetric in the sense that the strategy sets of users are different and the payoffs
are not symmetric.
Let Cj,Ω := log
(
1 +
∑
i∈Ω
Pijhij
σ2
0
)
be the capacity for a subset Ω ⊆ N of users at receiver j ∈ J
and rij,Ω := log
(
1 +
Pijhij
σ2
0
+
∑
i′∈Ω,i′ 6=i Pi′jhi′j
)
the bound rate of a user i when the signals of the |Ω|−1
other users are treated as noise at receiver j. Each receiver j has a capacity region C(j) given by
C(j) =
{
(α,pj) ∈ [0, 1]
N × RN+
∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N
αipij ≤ Cj,Ω,∀ ∅ ⊂ Ωj ⊆ N , j ∈ J
}
, (11)
The expected payoff function U i :
∏N
i=1Ai −→ R+ of the game is given by
U i(αi,pi, α−i,p−i) = Epi [uij(α,P)] =
∑
j∈J
pijuij(α,P), (12)
where α = (αi, α−i) ∈ RN+ and P ∈ [0, 1]
N×J = (pi,p−i), with pi ∈ [0, 1]
J ,p−i ∈ [0, 1]
(N−1)×J .
Assume that the utility uij of a user i transmitting to receiver j is only dependent on the user himself
and is described by a positive and strictly increasing function gi : R+ → R+, i.e., uij = gi,∀j ∈ J ,
when capacity constraints are satisfied.
With the presence of coupled constraints (11) from each receiver and probability measure con-
straint (10), each sender has his individual optimization problem (IOP) given as follows.
max
pi,αi
∑
j∈J pijgi(αipij)
s.t.
∑
j∈J pij = 1,∀i ∈ N
pij ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N , j ∈ J
(α,pj) ∈ C(j),∀j ∈ J
Denote the feasible set of (IOP) by F = F1 ×F2, where
F1 =
{
α ∈ RN+ | (α,P) ∈ ∩j∈J C(j),P ∈ F2
}
, (13)
F2 =

P ∈ RN×J |
∑
j∈J
pij = 1, pij ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N , j ∈ J

 . (14)
The action set of each user can thus be described by
Ai(α−i,p−i) = {(αi, α−i) ∈ F1, (pi,p−i) ∈ F2} . (15)
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3.1.1 An Example
Suppose we have three users and three receivers, that is, N = {1, 2, 3} and J = {1, 2, 3}. The
capacity region at receiver 1 is given by
C(1) =


αi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3
p11α1 ≤ log(1 +
P1h1
σ2
0
)
p21α2 ≤ log(1 +
P2h2
σ2
0
)
p31α3 ≤ log(1 +
P3h3
σ2
0
)
p11α1 + p21α2 ≤ log(1 +
P1h1+P2h2
σ2
0
)
p11α1 + p31α3 ≤ log(1 +
P1h1+P2h2
σ2
0
)
p21α2 + p31α3 ≤ log(1 +
P1h1+P2h2
σ2
0
)
p11α1 + p21α2 + p31α3 ≤ log(1 +
P1h1+P2h2+P3h3
σ2
0
)
0 ≤ pi1 ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, 3


.
This can be written into
C(1) =


p1 =

 p11p21
p31

 ∈ [0, 1]3,

 α1α2
α3

 ∈ R3+
∣∣∣∣M3

 p11α1p21α2
p31α3

 ≤


C1,{1}
C1,{2}
C1,{3}
C1,{1,2}
C1,{1,3}
C1,{2,3}
C1,{1,2,3}




,
where C1,Ω = log
(
1 +
∑
i∈Ω
Pi1hi1
σ2
0
)
and M3 is a totally unimodular matrix: M3 :=


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1


.
Capacity regions at receivers 2 and 3 can be obtained in a similar way.
3.2 Characterization of Constrained Nash Equilibria
In this subsection, we characterize the Nash equilibria of the defined game Ξ under the given
capacity constraint. We use the following theorem to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for
the case where the rates are predetermined; this result is then used to solve the game for the case
when both the rates and the connection probabilities are (joint) decision variables.
Theorem 4. (Bas¸ar & Olsder, [38]) Let A = A1 × A2 · · · × AN be a closed, bounded and convex
subset of RN , and for each i ∈ N , the payoff functional U i : A→ R be jointly continuous in A and
concave in ai for every aj ∈ Aj, j ∈ N , j 6= i. Then, the associated N -person nonzero-sum game
admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Applying Theorem 4, we have the following results immediately.
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Proposition 3. Suppose αi, i ∈ N , are predetermined feasible rates. Let feasible set F be closed,
bounded and convex. If gi in (IOP) are continuous on F and concave in pi (without the assumption
of being positive and strictly increasing), the expected payoff functions U i : RN+ × [0, 1]
N×J → R are
concave in pi and continuous on F , then the static game admits a Nash equilibrium.
The existence result in Proposition 3 only captures the case where the rates αi are predeter-
mined, and relies on the convexity requirement of the utility functions gi. We can actually obtain
a stronger existence result by observing that the formulated game Ξ is a potential game with a
potential function given by
Ψ(α,P) =
∑
i
fi(αi,pi) =
∑
i
∑
j
pijgi(αipij), (16)
where fi =
∑
j pijgi(αipij), the expected payoff to user i.
Note that the feasible set F is generally nonempty and bounded. We can conclude the existence
result in Proposition 4 of NE from this observation.
Proposition 4. The hybrid rate control game Ξ admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us formulate a centralized optimization problem (COP) as follows.
maxα,P Ψ(α,P)
s.t. (α,P) ∈ F
Using the result in [3], we can conclude that if there exists a solution to (COP), then there exists
a Nash equilibrium to the game Ξ. Since F is compact and nonempty, and the objective function
is continuous, there exists a solution to (COP) and thus a Nash equilibrium to the game.
The problem above is generally not convex and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium may not be
guaranteed. However, we still can further characterize the Nash equilibrium through the following
propositions.
Proposition 5. Let βij := αipij. Without predetermining α, suppose that (p−i, α−i) is feasible. A
best response strategy at receiver j ∈ J for user i must satisfy
0 ≤ pijαi ≤ Cj,Ωj −
∑
k 6=i
αkpkj,∀Ωj (17)
where Ωj := {Ω ∈ 2
N | i′ ∈ Ω, pi′j > 0} is the set of users transmitting to receiver j. Since gi is a
non-decreasing function, the best correspondence at j is
β∗ij = α
∗
i p
∗
ij = max

rij,N ,min
Ωj

Cj,Ωj−∑
i′ 6=i
αi′pi′j



 , (18)
where rij,N is the bound on the rate of user i when signals of |N | − 1 other users are treated as
noise.
Proof. The proof is immediate by observing that the rate of user i at receiver j must satisfy (17)
due to the coupled constraints. Thus, the maximum rate that user i can use to transmit to receiver
j without violating the constraints is clearly the minimum of Cj,Ωj −
∑
i′ 6=i αi′pi′j over all Ωj . Since
the payoff is a non-decreasing function, the best response for i at receiver j is given by (18).
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Proposition 6. Let K∗i = argmaxj∈J gij(βij). If K
∗
i = {k
∗} is a singleton, then the best reply for
user i is to choose {
pij = 1 if j = k
∗
i ,
pij = 0 otherwise,
and we can determine αi by αi =
βik∗
pik∗
.
If |K∗i | ≥ 2, then the best response correspondence is{
pi ∈ ∆(K
∗
i ) if j ∈ K
∗
i ,
0 otherwise.
We can determine αi from βij by αi =
∑
j∈K∗i
βij .
Proof. Since the expected utility is given in the form of
Ui(αi,pi, α−i,p−i) = Epi [uij(αipij)],
the expected utility under best response is Ui = Epi [uij(βij)]. If for a singleton k
∗ such that
k∗ = argmaxi∈N gij(βij), we can assign all the weight pik∗ = 1 to maximize the expected utility.
Since βik∗ = αipik∗ , then α = βik∗/pik∗ = βik∗ . If the set K
∗ is not a singleton, without loss of
generality, we can pick two indices j,j′ ∈ K∗ such that βij = αipij and βij′ = αipij′, leading to
uij(βij) = uij′(βij′). Since the utilities to transmit using j and j
′ are the same, we can assign
arbitrary (two-point) distribution, pij and pij′ over them, with pij+pij′ = 1. Therefore, βij+βij′ =
αi(pij + pij′) = αi.
3.3 Multiple Access Evolutionary Games
Interactions among users are dynamic and the users can update their rates and channel selection
with respect to their payoffs and the known coupled constraints. Such a dynamic process can
generally be modeled by either an evolutionary process, a learning process or a trial-and-error
updating process. In classical game theory, the focus is on strategies that optimize payoffs to the
players while, in evolutionary game theory, the focus is on strategies that will persist through time.
In this subsection, we formulate evolutionary games dynamics based on the static game discussed
in Section 3.1. We use generalized Smith-dynamics for channel selection and G-function based
dynamics for rates. Combining them, we set up a framework of hybrid dynamics for the overall
system.
The action of each user has two components (αi,pi) ∈ R+ × [0, 1]J . We use pi as strategies
that determine the fitness of user i’s rate αi to receiver j. The rate selection evolves according to
the channel selection strategy P. We may view channel selection as an inner game that involves a
process on a short time scale but the rate selection is an outer game that represents the dynamical
link via fitness on a longer time scale, [7], [8].
3.3.1 Learning the Weight Placed on Receiver
Let α be a fixed rate on the capacity region. We assume that user i occasionally experiments
the weights pij with alternative receivers, keeping the new strategy if and only if it leads to a
strict increase in payoff. If the choice of receivers’ weights of some users decreases the payoff or
violates the constraints due to a strategy change by another user, he starts a random search for a
new strategy, eventually settling on one with a probability that increases monotonically with its
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realized payoff. For the above generating function based dynamics, the weight of switching from
receiver j to receiver j′ is given by
ηijj′(α,P) = max(0, uij′(α,P) − uij(α,P))
θ , θ ≥ 1
if the payoff obtained at receiver j′ is greater the payoff obtained receiver j and the constraints
are satisfied; otherwise, ηijj′(p, α) = 0. The frequencies of uses of each receiver is then seen as the
selection strategy of receivers.
The expected change at each receiver is the difference between the incoming flow and the
outgoing flow. The dynamics is also called generalized Smith dynamics [2] and is given by
p˙ij(t) =
∑
j′∈J
pij′ (t)η
i
j′j(α,P(t)) − pij(t)
∑
j′∈J
ηijj′ (α,P(t)). (19)
Let χij(α,P(t)) :=
∑
j′∈J pij′(t)η
i
j′j(α,P(t))− pij(t)
∑
j′∈J η
i
jj′(α,P(t)). Hence, the dynamics can
be rewritten as p˙ij = χij(α,P(t)). For θ = 1 the dynamics is known as Smith dynamics and has
been used for describing the evolution of road traffic congestion in which the fitness is determined
by the strategies chosen by all drivers. It has also been studied in the context of the resource
selection in hybrid systems and migration constraint problem in wireless networks in [2].
Proposition 7. Any equilibrium of the game Ξ with predetermined rates is a rest points of the
generalized Smith dynamics (19).
Proof. The transition rate between receivers preserves the sign in the sense that, for every user,
incoming flow from the receiver j′ to j is positive if and only if the constraints are satisfied and
the payoff to j exceeds the payoff to j′. Let α be a feasible point. We first remark that if the right
hand side of (19) is non-zero for some splitting strategy P, then
d :=
∑
j∈J
p˙ijuij(α,P) =
∑
j∈J
χijuij(α,P)
=
∑
j,j′∈J
pij′
(
uij(α,P) − uij′(α,P)
)
ηij′j
=
∑
j,j′∈J
pij′ max
[
0,
(
uij(α,P) − uij′(α,P)
)]
ηij′j
which is strictly positive. Thus, if (α,P) is a Nash equilibrium then (α,P) satisfy the constraints,
and pij = 0, or η
i
jj′(α,P) = 0. This implies that (α,P) satisfies also χ(α,P)) = 0.
The following proposition says that the equilibria are exactly the rest point of (19).
Proposition 8. Any rest point of the dynamics (19) is a Nash equilibrium of the game Ξ.
The proof of Proposition 8 can be obtained by using Theorem III in [2]. Since the probability
to switch from receiver j to j′ is proportional to ηijj′, which preserves the sign of payoff difference,
we can use the Theorems III in [2]. It follows that the dynamics generated by η satisfy the Nash
stationarity property.
3.3.2 G-function Based Dynamics
We introduce here the generating fitness function (G-function) based dynamics with projection
onto the capacity region. The G-function approach has been successfully applied to non-linear
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continuous games by Vincent and Brown [7], [8]. It is appropriate for our hybrid model because
we can regard the channel selection as the variables in a fitness function. Users choose channel
selection probabilities to aim at increasing their fitness of their rate choice. In our rate allocation
game, to deal with constraints, we use projection into capacity region in order to preserve the
trajectories feasible. Starting from a point in the polytope C, each user revises and updates its
strategy according to a rate proportional to the gradient and its payoff subject to the capacity
constraints. Let Gij be the fitness generating function of user i at receiver j defined on RN ×RN×J
satisfying
Gij(v, α,P)
∣∣∣∣
v=pi
=

Cj,N − pijβij(t)− ∑
i′∈N\{i}
pi′jβi′j(t)

 ,
if (α,P) satisfies in the hybrid capacity region. Notice that the term Cj,N −
∑
i′ 6=i pi′jβi′j(t) is
maximum rate of i using channel j at time t. Hence, the G-function based dynamics is given by
β˙ij = −µ¯

pijβij − Cj,N +∑
i′ 6=i
pi′jβi′j

 pijβij . (20)
with initial conditions βij(0) ≤ Cj,{i}, where β = [βij ] is defined in Proposition 5, which is of the
same dimension as α, and αi(t) =
∑
j∈J βij(t); µ¯ is an appropriate parameter chosen for the rate
of convergence.
3.3.3 Hybrid Dynamics
We now combine the two evolutionary game dynamics described in the previous subsections. Vari-
ables α and P are both evolving in time. The overall dynamics are given by

p˙ij(t) =
∑
j′∈J pij′(t)η
i
j′j(α(t),P(t)) − pij(t)
∑
j′∈J η
i
jj′(α(t),P(t))
β˙ij(t) = −µ¯
[
pij(t)βij(t)− Cj,N +
∑
i′ 6=i pi′j(t)βi′j(t)
]
pij(t)βij(t)
αi(t) =
∑
j∈J βij(t), βij(0) ≤ Cj,{i},∀j ∈ J , i ∈ N
(21)
All the equilibria of the hybrid evolutionary rate control and channel selection are rest point of the
above hybrid dynamics. The following result can be obtained directly from Proposition 7 and (20).
Proposition 9. Let (β∗,P∗) be an interior rest points of the hybrid dynamics, i.e., β∗ij > 0, p
∗
ij > 0
and χ(α∗,P) = 0. Then for all j,
N∑
i=1
p∗ijβ
∗
ij = Cj,N ; χ

 N∑
j=1
β∗ij ,P
∗

 = 0.
3.4 Numerical Examples
In this subsection, we illustrate the evolutionary dynamics in (20) and (21) by examining a two-user
and three-receiver communication system as depicted in Figure 4. Let hi1 = 0.1, hi2 = 0.2, hi3 = 0.3,
for i = {1, 2}. Each transmission power Pi is set to 1 mW for all i = 1, 2 and the noise level is set
to σ2 = −20 dBm.
In the first experiment, we assume that the rates of the users are predetermined to be α =
[10, 20]T , the Smith dynamics in (20) yield in Figure (5) and (6) the response of p1 and p2. It can
be seen that the dynamics converge very fast within less than half a second.
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Figure 4: Two users and three receivers
In the second experiment, we assume that the probability matrix P has been optimally found
by the users using (19). Figures 7 and 8 show that the β values converge to an equilibrium from
which we can find the optimal value for α. Since these dynamics are much slower compared to
Smith dynamics on P, our assumption of knowledge of optimal P for a slowly varying α becomes
valid.
In the next experiment, we simulate the hybrid dynamics in (21). Let the probability pij of
user i choosing transmitter j and the transmission rates be initialized as follows:
P(0) =
[
0.2 0.3 0.5
0.25 0.5 0.25
]
, α(0) =
[
0.2
0.1
]
.
We let the parameter µ¯ = 0.9. Figure 9 shows the evolution of the weights of user 1 on each of the
receivers. The weights converge to be p1j = 1/3 for all j within two seconds, leading to an unbiased
choice among receivers. In Figure 10, we show the evolution of the weights of the second user on
each receiver. At the equilibrium, p2 = [0.3484, 0.4847, 0.1669]
T . It appears that user 2 favors
the second transmitter over the other ones. Since the utility uij is of the same form, the optimal
response set K∗i is naturally nonempty and contains all the receivers. Shown in Proposition 6, the
probability of choosing a receiver at the equilibrium is randomized among the three receivers and
can be determined by the rates α chosen by the users.
The β-dynamics determines the evolution of α in (21). In Figure 11, we see that the evolutionary
dynamics yield α = [15.87, 23.19]T at the equilibrium. It is easy to verify that they satisfy the
capacity constraints outlined in Section 2. It converges within 5 seconds and appears be much
slower than in Figures 9 and 10. Hence, it can be seen that P−dynamics may be seen as the inner
loop dynamics while β−dynamics can be seen as an outer loop evolutionary dynamics. They evolve
on two different time scales. In addition, thanks to Proposition 8, finding the rest points for the
above dynamics ensures us finding the equilibrium.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied an evolutionary multiple access channel game with a continuum
action space and coupled rate constraints. We showed that the game has a continuum of strong
equilibria which are 100% efficient in the rate optimization problem. We proposed the constrained
Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, Smith dynamics, and the replicator dynamics to study the
stability of equilibria in the long run. In addition, we have introduced a hybrid multiple access
game model and its corresponding evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We have analyzed the
22
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Nash equilibrium for the static game and suggested a system of evolutionary game dynamics based
method to find it. It is found that the Smith dynamics for channel selections are a lot faster
than the β-dynamics, and the combined dynamics yield a rest point that corresponds to the Nash
equilibrium. An interesting extension that we leave for future research is to introduce a dynamic
channel characteristics: the gains hij(t) are time-dependent random variables. Another interesting
23
question is to find equilibria structure in the case of multiple access games with non-convex capacity
regions.
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